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MONTANA SUPREME COURT
SURVEY
EDITOR'S NOTE
Volume 41 continues the annual Montana Supreme Court Sur-
vey, analyzing opinions of the Montana Supreme Court during the
period beginning October 1, 1978, and ending December 31, 1979.
This year, the student authors and the faculty advisers have at-
tempted to fashion cogent and scholarly discussions of legal
changes, adopting the style of analysis traditionally reserved for
case notes and comments. By use of such a method, the surveys can
provide material to both the reader seeking a summary of recent
developments and the legal researcher seeking authority for particu-
lar legal doctrines. The second half of the survey, covering Civil
Procedure, Evidence, and Criminal Procedure, will appear in Vol-
ume 41, Number 2.
PART I
TORTS
Carolyn Clemens
INTRODUCTION
During the period of this survey, the Montana court handed
down significant opinions regarding damages in tort actions, in-
cluding cases involving apportionment of damages and contribu-
tion among multiple tortfeasors. In addition, the court clarified the
burden of proof under the theory of res ipsa loquitur and struck
down a commonly used jury instruction which it found inconsistent
with the res ipsa doctrine. The court also indicated that attorneys
bringing products liability at;, ,Q aio;,nt drug manu.acturers
must in some situations rely on expert testimony. Finally, the court
made it clear that an insurance company that refuses to pay a
claim found to be valid may be liable for both consequential and
punitive damages.
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I. RES IPSA LOQUITUR
A. Burden of Proof
The Montana court attempted to resolve an inconsistency in
prior Montana case law in deciding the procedural effect of the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine.' Directly faced with the issue for the first
time in Helmke v. Goff,' Justice Sheehy, writing for the majority,
indicated that the application of that doctrine will not necessarily
shift the burden to the defendant to prove an affirmative defense.3
Rather, upon the establishment of a res ipsa case by the plaintiff,
the jury must decide "whether the preponderance of the evidence is
with the plaintiff."'
Helmke arose out of a single-car accident in which defendant's
car, for no apparent reason, crossed the center line, skidded back,
and rolled into a ditch.5 At trial, both the driver and the plaintiff
testified that they had no idea why the accident happened, and the
defendant driver offered no explanation or defense. At plaintiff's
request, the case was submitted to the jury on a res ipsa instruc-
tion, and the jury found for the defendant. Plaintiff appealed, con-
tending that because the defendant was unable to rebut the pre-
sumption of negligence, the doctrine demanded a finding of
liability.'
The supreme court noted that jurisdictions disagree on the al-
location of the burden of proof in res ipsa cases, and indicated that
the Montana court has gone both ways in this matter.7 Other
courts have justified their decisions by determining whether the ju-
risdiction is one following the "permissible inference" theory or the
"rebuttable presumption" theory.' Helmke declined to follow ei-
1. See Whitney v. Northwest Greyhound, 125 Mont. 528, 531, 242 P.2d 257, 258 (1952)
for-a discussion of the two lines of Montana cases.
2. - Mont. -, 597 P.2d 1131 (1979).
3. The Montana court relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Swee-
ney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 240 (1913).
4. Helmke, - Mont. -, 597 P2d at 1132.
5. Id. at __, 597 P.2d at 1133.
6. See Callahan v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R. Co., 47 Mont. 401, 415, 133 P. 687, 691 (1913)
in which the court found that "proof of the happening of the event raises a presumption of
the defendant's negligence, and casts upon the defendant the burden of showing that ordi-
nary care was used." Cf. Hickman v. First National Bank, 112 Mont. 398, 415, 117 P.2d 275,
279 (1941) (approving a finding that res ipsa loquitur does not cast upon the defendant the
burden of disproving negligence in the sense of making it incumbent upon him to establish
freedom from negligence by a preponderance of the evidence).
7. Whitney v. Northwest Greyhound, 125 Mont. 528, 531, 242 P.2d 257, 258 (1952). See
also Annot., 29 A.L.R. 2d 1390 (1953).
8. Helmke, - Mont. -, 597 P2d at 1133, citing discussion in 2 HARPER & JAMES, LAW
OF Toam § 19.11 (1956). This discussion indicates that Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233
(1913) is the leading case relying on the "permissible inference" theory. See generally W.
[Vol. 41
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ther, finding that such a classification should not be the controlling
factor
Rather, in reviewing the United States Supreme Court's opin-
ion in Sweeney v. Erving, the Montana court found the Supreme
Court's language to be dispositive:
[R]es ipsa loquitur means that the facts of the occurrence warrant
the inference of negligence, not that they compel such an infer-
ence . . .; that [the facts] furnish evidence to be weighed, not
necessarily to be accepted as sufficient; that [the facts] call for an
explanation or rebuttal, not necessarily that they require it; that
they make a case to be decided by the jury."0
The court did, indicate, however, that there could be some in-
stances in which a court would be justified in directing a verdict in
a res ipsa case. If the inference of negligence is "so strong that per-
sons of reasonable minds could not reach differing conclusions as to
the negligence of the defendant,"" the district court could grant a
motion for a directed verdict.
B. Mere Happening Doctrine
In Helmke v. Goff, '2 the trial court gave the jury a standard res
ipsa loquitur instruction and a "mere happening" instruction:
The mere fact that an accident happened, considered alone, does
not give rise to an inference that it was caused by negligence or
that any party to this action was negligent. '3
The Montana court decided on appeal that a trial court cannot
give this instruction in res ipsa cases and emphasized that the in-
struction should be "given a decent burial" in ordinary negligence
actions."
Speaking for the majority, Justice Sheehy noted that in the
earlier case of Hunsaker v. Bozeman Deaconess Foundation, '1 the
Montana court recognized that in ordinary negligence cases the
doctrine was "confusing to the jury and injected a straw issue into
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 40 (4th ed. 1971).
9. Helmke, - Mont. -, 597 P.2d at 1133. Justice Sheehy indicated that "[it is safe to
say that the difference between an inference and a presumption escapes all but the most
nimble legal minds..." The court found that it was unnecessary to classify Montana as a
jurisdiction following either theory. Id.
10. Sweeney, 228 U.S. at 240.
11. Helmke, - Mont. -, 597 P.2d at 1134.
12. - Mont. -. , 597 P.2d 1131 (1979).
13. Id. at __ 597 P.2d at 1132.
14. Id. at -, 597 P.2d at 1134.
15. - Mont. -, 588 P.2d 493 (1978).
1980]
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the case."16 Referring to a 1967 Montana case dealing with the sim-
ilar "unavoidable accident" instruction, 7 Hunsaker cited with ap-
proval the court's earlier view that such an instruction "diverts the
attention of the jury from the primary issue of negligence and cre-
ates the impression in the minds of the jurors of a second hurdle
that plaintiff must overcome if he is to prevail.' 8 Although con-
demning the instruction in the ordinary negligence action, Hun-
saker did approve the use of a modified form of that instruction in
malpractice actions, finding that the instruction was not error in a
"professional malpractice action."'"
Faced with this instruction in Helmke, a res ipsa case, the
court found that giving the "mere happening" instruction required
reversal. 0 The court feared confusion to the jurors, since they
might believe that "they are foreclosed from considering the evi-
dence provided by the happening of the accident itself."'" The very
nature of the res ipsa case makes this necessary evidence, with the
result that the instructions on res ipsa loquitur and "mere happen-
ing" are too incompatible to stand together. 2
16. Id. at __, 588 P.2d at 5616. See also Annot., 65 A.L.R. 2d 12 (1959).
17. In Graham v. Rolandson, 150 Mont. 270, 435 P.2d 263 (1967), the court considered
the following unavoidable accident instruction:
[I1f you find from all the facts and circumstances, as shown by the evidence in this
case, that the plaintiff's injuries were the result of a pure and unavoidable acci-
dent, such as could not ordinarily be anticipated, and not the result of the negli-
gence of either the defendant or the plaintiff, then the plaintiff cannot recover, and
your verdict must be for the defendant.
Id. at 290, 435 P.2d at 272. The court held that this instruction was proper in so few situa-
tions that it should never be used. The court also noted that the Montana Jury Instruction
Guide (MJIG) Instruction No. 12 recommended that the unavoidable accident instruction
not be used. Id.
18. Graham v. Rolandson, 150 Mont. 270, 290, 435 P.2d 263, 273-(1967).
19. Hunsaker, - Mont. -, 588 P2d at 506, citing CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTION, CIVIL
No. 602:
A physician or surgeon is not negligent merely because [his efforts are unsuccess-
ful,] (he makes a mistake or] [he errs in judgment] in the matter for which he was
engaged.
However, if the physician or surgeon was negligent as defined in these instruc-
tions it is not a defense that he did the best he could.
The court also indicated that this instruction would be proper in an action against an
attorney. Id. at -, 588 P.2d at 506.
20. Helmke, - Mont. -, 597 P2d at 1134.
21. Id.
22. Id. The court cited Jensen v. Minard, 44 Cal.2d 325, 282 P.2d 7 (1955) in which the
defendant killed a child while shooting at birds in his garden. Justice Traynor indicated that
an "unavoidable accident" instruction would have been prejudicial, in that the jury might
then assume that the accident was unavoidable, and not owing to any negligence. Id. at -,
282 P.2d at 9.
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11. EXPERTS IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The Montana court has consistently required a plaintiff to in-
troduce expert testimony to establish a malpractice claim. 3 This
rule now has been extended to a strict liability claim based on the
alleged failure of a drug manufacturer to warn of the dangers inher-
ent in its product. The court held in Hill v. Squibb & Sons24 that
because the extent of the warning needed on a prescription drug is
a subject about which a layman would have no knowledge, the
court and jury must rely on evidence supplied by experts.2 1
In Hill, the plaintiff ingested large doses of steroids for nearly
20 years to treat an allergy. One of the drugs his physician pre-
scribed was produced by Squibb and Sons. Plaintiff alleged that
the drug was negligently manufactured and was "a defective prod-
uct because the drug package inserts did not warn specifically
enough of the dangerous side effects.""6 Squibb's motion for a di-
rected verdict was granted because of the plaintiff's failure to intro-
duce expert testimony to show that warnings contained on the drug
were inadequate.Y The supreme court affirmed, finding that the
plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case.28
The court appears29 to adopt the rationale contained in "com-
ment (j)" of Section 402A of the Restatement, which indicates that
a manufacturer can escape liability for selling a dangerous product
by providing an adequate warning on the product.30 Additionally,
the court found that the duty to warn could be discharged by warn-
ing the prescribing physician, rather than the patient .3 To prove
23. Llera v. Wisner, 171 Mont. 254, 262, 557 P.2d 805, 810 (1976). The court noted that
a plaintiff must establish a standard of medical practice by expert testimony and show de-
fendant's deviation from that standard.
24. - Mont. -, 592 P.2d 1383 (1979).
25. The court referred to its holding in Callahan v. Burton, 157 Mont. 513, 520, 487
P.2d 515, 518-19, in which the court did not submit the issue of failure of proper diagnosis to
the jury because the plaintiff introduced no expert testimony as to the doctor's alleged lack
of skill. There the court noted that because the jury could have no knowledge about the
diagnosis, the jury had to rely on expert testimony. See also Annot., 62 A.L.R. 2d 1426
(1958).
26. Hill, _ Mont. -, 592 P.2d at 1386.
27. Id.
28. Id. at -, 592 P.2d at 1384.
29. The court relied on Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 127-29 (9th Cir.
1968), citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A, comment j (1965) and held that by
providing an adequate warning the manufacturer can prevent the product from being
deemed unreasonably dangerous.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS §402A, comment j (1965) provides as follows:
Directions or warning. In order to prevent the product from being unreasona-
bly dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the
container, as to its use ...
31. This was the holding in Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968), in
19801 TORTS
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that the warning to the physician was inadequate, a plaintiff must
introduce expert testimony to establish the scope and content of a
sufficient warning and the expert must testify to a deviation from
that standard.2
II. DAMAGES
A. Additur
In Ferguson v. Town Pump, Inc.," decided in June 1978, the
Montana Supreme Court noted in dictum that it was within the
constitutional power of a trial court to condition denial of a plain-
tiff's motion for a new trial on defendant's consent to an increase in
the jury award.14 Six months later, in Bohrer v. Clark,35 the court
expressly overruled that portion of the Town Pump decision. The
court found this practice of additur to be an impermissible interfer-
ence with the plaintiff's right to trial by jury,3 reaffirming the
court's 1964 decision in State Highway Commission v. Schmidt. 7
In Town Pump, the plaintiffs moved the district court to in-
crease the damage award, or alternatively, to grant a new trial on
the issue of damages. Similarly, the plaintiff in Bohrer alleged that
the jury award of $30,500 was contrary to the evidence at trial38 and
asked the district judge for relief. The district court amended the
judgement, awarding Bohrer $50,614.93. Both parties appealed.
The supreme court, again considering the practice of additur,
concluded that the rule announced in Schmidt was correct and that
the district court's reliance on Zook Brothers' Construction Co. v.
State of Montana39 was misplaced 0 In Zook, the supreme court had
which the court indicated that a warning to a physician was adequate unless the drug was
dispensed directly to consumers, over-the-counter, or at mass clinics "without an individual-
ized balancing by a physician of the risks involved." Id. at 130-31.
32. In support of this holding, the court cited Carlsen v. Javurek, 526 F.2d 202 (8th
Cir. 1975). The plaintiff in that case alleged an inadequate warning on a prescription drug.
The court noted that all of the experts found the warning to be adequate and that the plain-
tiff offered no expert to refute that testimony. Based on this failure, the court allowed a
directed verdict in favor of the manufacturer. Id.
33. - Mont. -, 580 P.2d 915 (1978).
34. Id. at -, 580 P.2d at 919-20. Although the question of additur was not raised on
appeal in Town Pump, the court remarked that several jurisdictions allowed this practice
and that it should be adopted in Montana. Id.
35. - Mont. -, 590 P.2d 117 (1979).
36. - Mont. -, 590 P.2d at 122, citing Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1934),
which held that additur will "compel the plaintiff to forego his constitutional right to the
verdict of a jury and accept an assessment partly made by a jury and partly made by a
tribunal which has no power to assess."
37. 143 Mont. 505, 391 P.2d 692 (1964).
38. Bohrer, - Mont. -, 590 P2d at 120.
39. 171 Mont. 64, 556 P.2d 911 (1976).
40. Bohrer, - Mont. L_ 590 P2d at 122. 6
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increased an award following a non-jury trial merely to correct a
mathematical miscalculation." In refusing to extend the Zook
doctrine to those cases in which a plaintiff asks the district court for
relief following a jury trial, the court indicated that under Montana
Rules of Civil Procedure 59(a)4 2 the lower court could grant a new
trial limited solely to the issue of damages. This would eliminate the
need for additur, and preserve the right to a jury trial.4 3
The blow dealt additur apparently will not affect remittitur,
which involves the reduction of an excessive jury award by the
court. Bohrer reviewed the cases cited in Zook, in which a change
in the jury award had been permitted, and found all of them to be
distinguishable factually from Bohrer and Town Pump. The cases
involved a reduction of the jury award, a practice recognized under
previous case law where the award was not supported by the evi-
dence." The Bohrer court implied that Montana will continue to
distinguish between additur and remittitur, based on the theory
that in dealing with a reduction in damages, "the right to trial by
jury is . . .not a controlling factor."4 5
B. Consequential and Punitive Damages in Insurance Cases
The Montana Supreme Court this year approved a trend de-
veloping in other jurisdictions of punishing an insurance company
for a willful refusal to pay a valid claim." Allowing the insured
party to recover both consequential and punitive damages in God-
dard v. Bankers Union Life Insurance Co.,' the court recognized
that a single transaction may give rise to both a breach of the in-
surance contract and a tort claim, if a plaintiff can show the breach
41. Zook, 171 Mont. at 76, 556 P.2d at 918.
42. MoNT. R. Civ. P. 59 (a) provides:
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the
issues for any of the reasons provided by the statutes of the State of Montana.
43. Bohrer, __ Mont. __, 590 P2d at 123.
44. See, e.g., Nesbitt v. City of Butte, 118 Mont. 84, 94, 163 P.2d 251, 256 (1945), in
which the court allowed remittitur, but indicated that a new trial would have been a better
procedure. In Klemens & Sons v. Reber Plumbing & Heating, 139 Mont. 115, 126, 360 P.2d
1005, 1011 (1961), the court held that the reduction was made because of a mathematical
error.
45. Bohrer, - Mont. -, 590 P2d at 122. The court cited State Highway Comm'n v.
Schmidt, 143 Mont. 505, 511, 391 P.2d 692, 695 (1964), a case which relied upon the follow-
ing language from Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1934):
Where the verdict is excessive, the practice of substituting a remission of the
excuse for a new trial is not without plausible support in the view that what re-
mains is included in the verdict ... in that sense that it has been found by the
jury and that the remittitur has the effect of merely lopping [the excess].
46. See,e.g., Kirk v. Safeco Ins. Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 44, 46, 273 N.E.2d 919, 921 (1970)
(assessing punitive damages on a finding that the insurance company had no good faith
intention of honoring its insured's claim); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn.,
58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18-19, 426 P.2d 173, 178-79 (1967) (insurance company breached duty to
accept offer of reasonable settlement). See also Annot., 47 A.L.R. 3d 314 (1973).
47. - Mont. __ 593 P.2d 1040 (1979).
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of a duty independent of the contract."
The plaintiff in Goddard purchased a credit life and disability
insurance policy from a Bozeman bank, in conjunction with the ex-
ecution of a note and security agreement between Goddard and the
bank to finance a car. The policy was issued by the bank as an
agent of the insurance company. The policy guaranteed that the
insurance company would pay the note if Goddard became unable
to pay because of death or disability.49
The district court found that Goddard became disabled on Oc-
tober 5, and that his insurance policy came into existence on Octo-
ber 4 or 5.50 Thus the refusal of the insurance company to pay the
claim was found to be a willful refusal to pay, even though the
insurance company claimed a good faith belief that the obligation
did not take effect until October 7.51 Because neither Goddard nor
the insurance company paid the note, the bank repossessed God-
dard's car and sued Goddard to recover the deficiency. Goddard in
turn sued the insurance company for the amount due under the
insurance contract and for consequential and exemplary damages.
The supreme court found that by violating the state statutory
insurance provisions," the insurance company became liable not
only for the amount due on the contract, but also for damages
which could compensate the plaintiff for the "detriment proxi-
mately caused [by the violation] whether it could be anticipated or
not. '5 3 The court reasoned that the insurance company had
breached its statutory duty of good faith and fair dealing," a duty
separate from that arising under the contract, and enforceable
48. Id. at 1047, citing Battista v. Lebanon Trotting Assoc., 538 F.2d 111, 117 (6th Cir.
1967). The court defined those situations in which a breach of contract can also give rise to a
tort action:
The tort liability of parties to a contract arises from the breach of some positive
legal duty imposed by law, because of the relationship of the parties, rather than
from a mere omission to perform a contract obligation.
49. Id. at -, 593 P.2d at 1042.
50. The court found that the insurance obligation arose at the time Goddard signed
the note and deposited it in the mail in Libby, Montana. Goddard testified that the date of
deposit was either October 4 or 5. Id. at -, 593 P.2d at 1042.
51. The insurance company contended that its obligation to pay did not arise until
October 7, the date that the Bozeman bank received the signed instrument and issued the
policy. The court rejected this contention. Id.at -, 593 P.2d at 1045.
52. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 33-21-105 (1979) provides:
"All claims shall be settled as soon as possible and in accordance with the terms of the
insurance contract."
53. The court rejected both Goddard's claim that the damages should be determined
by MCA § 27-1-311 (1979), defining the measure of damages for breach of contract, and the
insurance company's contentions that MCA § 27-1-312 (1979), governing contracts to pay a
liquidated sum, should apply. Rather, the court found that MCA § 27-1-317 (1979), allowing
recovery for all detriment proximately caused in tort, should apply.
54. Goddard, __ Mont. -, 593 P2d at 1047.
[Vol. 41
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through tort liability 5
In assessing punitive damages, the court relied on the Mon-
tana case of State ex rel. Larson v. District Court."e In Larson the
court had held that violation of a law carrying a criminal penalty
- such as the Montana insurance law - allowed assessment of
punitive damages, even though punitive damages normally are not
allowed for breach of contract . 7 Although the insurance company
contended that it should not be assessed for punitive damages be-
cause it did not act wantonly or maliciously,58 the court found im-
plied malice in the insurance company's refusal to pay. Because
the company violated its statutory duty, its conduct was unjustifi-
able, and therefore malicious.'
C. Apportionment of Damages
Azure v. City of Billings0 provided the Montana Supreme
Court with an-opportunity to define the duty of the trial court in
instructing a jury as to divisibility of injuries and apportionment of
damages. In addition, the court clarified the procedural burdens of
the parties in cases involving multiple tortfeasors, whether jointly
and severally liable or proportionately liable.
In Azure, the plaintiff filed separate lawsuits against a Billings
bar owner and the city police for incidents occurring in one night.
He alleged injuries arising out of a bar fight and lack of medical
care during subsequent incarceration. The bar owner settled out of
court for $10,000; the case proceeded to trial against the other de-
fendant, the city of Billings." At trial, the Billings police con-
tended that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by the other defen-
dant and denied any liability.2 The jury instructions stated that if
the city were found liable, the $10,000 out-of-court settlement
would have to be deducted from the verdict whether the city was
wholly or.only proportionately liable for divisible injuries. 3
55. Id.
56. 149 Mont. 131, 423 P.2d 598 (1967).
57. Id. at 135-36, 423 P.2d at 600. The court noted that an insurance company may
have both breached the insurance contract and violated Montana law.
58. Goddard, - Mont. -, 593 P2d at 1048.
59. Id. at -, 593 P.2d at 1049.
60. - Mont. -, 596 P.2d 460 (1979).
61. The plaintiff alleged that he was assaulted in a Billings bar by the owner with a
heavy blunt object. Seven hours later, in response to a reported burglary, the Billings police
found the apparently intoxicated plaintiff at the scene of the burglary, and took him to the
city jail. Although plaintiff showed signs of the barroom injury, the police provided no medi-
cal treatment for nearly sixteen hours. Id. at -, 596 P.2d at 462-63.
62. Azure, __ Mont. -, 596 P.2d at 463.
63. Id. at -, 596 P.2d at 466.
1980]
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On appeal, the court found that the instruction was prejudicial
to the plaintif 4 because it failed to distinguish between situations
in which liability is joint and several" and cases in which liability
is divisible." Because a deduction is appropriate only in the case of
joint and several liability, it is essential for a trial judge to deter-
mine the nature of the liability before submitting the case to the
jury.6 In a case of joint and several liability, the court noted that
there may be facts that make it reasonable to inform the jury of an
out-of-court settlement so that jurors may use this information in
reaching a proper award. 8 But the court indicated that the prefera-
ble method of deduction in cases of joint and several liability, and
the only proper method in cases of divisible liability, is the "court
method." 9 To prevent prejudice to the plaintiff, the court should
instruct the jury to find a total damage award, from which the
court itself will deduct the amount of settlement.
The supreme court imposed on the defendants the duty to
show the divisibility of injuries in the appropriate case. The court
refused to increase the plaintiff's burden by requiring him to prove
the portion of the total injury caused by each of the multiple
tortfeasors. 0 Once the plaintiff has made out a prima facie showing
that several defendants proximately caused his injuries, the defen-
dant must "either deny all liability or . . . prove that the harm
caused can be divided and the damages therefore apportioned."7'
64. The jury might consider evidence of settlement as indicating that the defendant is
free from fault. The court also feared prejudice to the defendant in that the "jury might
imply his negligence from the admission of negligence by the [settling party]." Luth v. Rog-
ers and Babler Construction Co., 507 P.2d 761, 768 (Alas. 1973).
65. Deducting $10,000.00 would be appropriate in the case of joint and several liability,
because "if liability is joint and several, the plaintiff is entitled to only one recovery. In that
event, deduction of an amount already paid by a joint tortfeasor is appropriate." Azure, -
Mont. -, 596 P.2d at 468, relying on Black v. Martin, 88 Mont. 256, 266, 292 P. 577, 581
(1930).
66. "But if apportionment of damages applies, each defendant must pay his contribu-
tion to the whole, and therefore, a deduction is not allowed for what another tortfeasor has
paid." Azure, __ Mont. -, 596 P.2d at 469.
67. Id. at -, 596 P.2d at 471.
68. Id. at -' 596 P.2d at 467.
69. Luth v. Rogers and Babler Construction Co., 507 P.2d 761, 768 (Alas. 1973) (judge
should not inform jury of settlement, but merely deduct it himself after verdict is in).
70. Azure, - Mont. -, 596 P2d at 469-70. Where the harm cannot be theoretically
divided, or if the plaintiff cannot practically make a division among wrongdoers, the court
does not want to prevent an innocent plaintiff from recovering merely because he cannot
prove which of the multiple, tortious acts caused a single harm. See generally W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 52 (4th ed. 1971).
71. Id. at -, 596 P.2d at 471 (court's emphasis).
130 [Vol. 41
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D. Contribution and Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors
The Montana Supreme Court decided that Montana will re-
tain, in most instances, the common law rule that prevents contri-
bution or indemnity among joint tortfeasors.72 The court construed
the Montana contribution statute 3 for the first time in Consoli-
dated Freightways Corp. v. Osier,74 delineating those few situations
in which contribution or indemnity would apply. 5
The plaintiff in Consolidated brought an action in United
States District Court for injuries suffered in a collision between the
car in which she was a passenger and a Consolidated truck. Consol-
idated then attempted to bring in the driver of the car as a third-
party defendant on a claim of indemnity. After Judge Smith dis-
missed the third party complaint, Consolidated amended its com-
plaint asking for contribution from the driver under the contribu-
tion statute. In order to decide the issue in conformity with
Montana law, Judge Smith certified the question as to contribu-
tion77 to the Montana Supreme Court.
The supreme court indicated that in Montana there is no right
to contribution among joint tortfeasors 8 and only with the passage
72. See Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1366 (1958), indicating that this is the majority view in
the, United States, although a minority of courts have found the rule unjust and allow contri-
bution among joint tortfeasors in those instances in which none of the tortfeasors committed
an intentional wrong.
73. MCA § 27-1-703 (1979) provides:
(1) Whenever the comparative negligence of the parties in any action is an issue
and recovery is allowed against more than one party, each such party is jointly
and severally liable for the amount awarded to the claimant but has the right of
contribution from any other party against whom recovery is allowed. Contribution
shall be proportional to the negligence of the parties against whom recovery is
allowed.
(2) If for any reason all or part of the contribution from a party liable for contri-
bution cannot be obtained, each of the other parties against whom recovery is al-
lowed is liable to contribute a proportional part of the unpaid portion of the non-
contributing party's share and may obtain judgment in a pending or subsequent
action for contribution from the non-contributing party.
74. - Mont. -, - P.2d -, 36 St. Rptr. 1810 (1979).
75. A few jurisdictions have allowed contribution without a statute when all tortfeasors
are merely negligent. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 452-53, 104 A. 815, 817 (1918);
Ellis v. Chicago and N.W. Ry. Co., 167 Wis. 392, 410, 167 N.W. 1048, 1054 (1918). A major-
ity of jurisdictions now allow contribution among joint tortfeasors by statute, though circum-
stances differ from state to state. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 51 (4th
ed. 1971).
76. Consolidated, - Mont. __ __ P.2d -, 36 St. Rptr. at 1811.
77. "As a matter of substantive Montana law, does a tortfeasor have a cause of action
for contribution or indemnity against any joint tortfeasor not joined by the plaintiff as a
party defendant?" Id. at _ - P.2d -, 36 St. Rptr. at 1811.
78. See Panusuk v. Seaton, 277 F.Supp. 979, 981 (D. Mont. 1965) in which Judge
Jameson recognized the general rule that "one of several wrongdoers cannot recover against
another wrongdoer, although he may have been compelled to pay all the damages for the
11
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of the contribution statute was there any reason to question this
proposition.7 The 1977 law provided for contribution, but the Mon-
tana court found that it has only limited application: "[The contri-
bution statute] applies only in comparative negligence cases and
only where recovery is allowed against more than one party." s
Thus contribution among defendants is not permitted in those
cases in which the plaintiff's negligence did not contribute to the
accident;8 ' nor may a defendant seek contribution from a party the
plaintiff has not chosen to sue. The court acknowledged that Rule
14 of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure permits third-party
suits, but Justice Sheehy noted that Rule 14 is procedural only and
not intended to change substantive rights under Montana law.82
After looking at the legislative history and finding no intent to
radically change Montana law," the court considered whether it
should judicially change the contribution rule. Despite case law
from other jurisdictions allowing contribution from both defendants
and non-parties," the Montana court preferred the approach taken
by the Washington court in Wenatchee Wenoka Growers Associa-
tion v. Krack Corp.15 The Washington court found that although
both contribution and comparative negligence are aimed at greater
fairness by apportioning responsibility among the parties, the pol-
icy considerations underlying each are different." For these rea-
sons, the Montana court found that the adoption of the compara-
tive negligence statute87 did not necessarily mean that contribution
wrong done." Later Montana cases cited Panusuk for this proposition. Auto. Club Ins. Co. v.
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 166 Mont. 221, 225, 531 P.2d 1337, 1339 (1975).
79. Consolidated, - Mont -, - P.2d -, 36 St. Rptr. at 1811.
80. Id. at -, - P.2d __, 36 St. Rptr. at 1813.
81. This result does not appear to be consistent with the title of the act appearing in
the original statutory text of REvisED CODES OF MONTANA 1947, § 58-607.2: "An act to provide
that multiple defendants in negligence actions contribute to payment of the judgment in
proportion to their comparative negligence." See generally V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEG-
UGENCE § 16.7 (1974) for a discussion of the inapplicability of comparative negligence to
contribution.
82. Consolidated, - Mont. P.2d -, 36 St. Rptr. at 1813.
83. The supreme court discussed the legislature's act of striking a proposal for "joinder
of any parties whose negligence may have contributed as a proximate cause to the damages
claimed by the plaintiff." Id. at __, - P.2d -, 36 St. Rptr. at 1813.
84. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis.2d 1, 8, 114 N.W.2d 105, 107 (1963); Bedell v. Reagan,
459 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24, 26 (1963).
85. 89 Wash.2d 847, 576 P.2d 388 (1978).
86. Id. at __, 576 P.2d at 389-90. The Washington court noted that comparative negli-
gence is directed at compensating a plaintiff who has suffered a tort-related loss and involves
comparing the negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant. Contribution is directed at dis-
tributing the damages between or among tortfeasors and does not change the recovery which
a plaintiff is entitled to receive.
87. MCA § 27-1-702 (1979).
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should be allowed in all circumstances."
Additionally, the court held that the contribution statute did
not change the Montana law of indemnification. 81 Montana has
consistently allowed a third-party claim by the defendant for in-
demnity against non-joined parties in those cases in which the de-
fendant's liability arises from the relationship between the plaintiff
and the defendant and not from the defendant's negligence. 0 In
addition, the Montana court has recognized the distinctions be-
tween active or primary negligence and passive or secondary negli-
gence, allowing indemnification to a passively negligent party"' and
denying it when the parties are found to be in pari delicto12
In Wright v. DeBeer Mechanical Construction Co., 93 decided
shortly after Consolidated, the court relied on Consolidated to al-
low indemnification and to deny -a claim for contribution. A
plumber on a project at Big Sky of Montana was injured on the job
and sued the subcontractor DeBeer, the general contractor Wright,
and Big Sky. The subcontractor settled with the plumber for
$3,000, but the plumber continued the suit against the other two
defendants. The contractor Wright paid the full amount of the
88. Consolidated, - Mont. -, - P.2d -, 36 St. Rptr. at 1815.
89. The court noted that indemnification has been defined as contribution in its most
extreme form. Id.
90. In Crosby v. Billings Deaconess Hosp., 149 Mont. 314, 426 P.2d 217 (1967), the
Montana court allowed a claim of indemnity against a non-joined party. In that case, plain-
tiff sued the hospital for burns received when he put a television regulator switch in his
mouth. The television equipment was leased and maintained by the Mid-West Leasing Co.
The hospital filed a third-party claim against Mid-West, and Mid-West moved for summary
judgment on the theory that the hospital was a joint tortfeasor and was barred from seeking
contribution. The court reversed the summary judgment because the hospital raised the is-
sue in the pleadings that the plaintiff's injury was caused solely by the negligence of Mid-
West, and the hospital was thus entitled to indemnity.
91. The Montana Supreme Court has adopted Judge Jameson's statement in Great
Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 690, 693 (D. Mont. 1968):
Where the parties are not in pari delicto, and an injury results from the act of one
party whose negligence is the primary, active and proximate cause of the injury,
and another party, who is not negligent or whose negligence is remote, passive and
secondary, is nevertheless exposed to liability by the acts of the first party, the
first party may be liable to the second party for the full amount of damages in-
curred by such acts.
See Fletcher v. City of Helena, 163 Mont. 337, 342, 517 P.2d 365, 368 (1973).
92. In Fletcher, the court found that the city as lessor was negligent in failing to in-
spect or repair a heater in the lessee's apartment, after the lessee notified the city that the
heating was defective. The city's claim for indemnity from Montana Power Company was
denied, because although Montana Power may have been negligent, the city was found to be
actively negligent by its omission. The court found that "the difference in the gravity of the
faults of the participants [was not] so great as to throw the whole loss upon [Montana
Power]." Id. at 342, 517 P.2d at 368-69. See generally Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1355, 1356 (1963)
(four situations allowing indemnity).
93. - Mont. -, 604 P.2d 323 (1979).
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judgment and did not seek contribution from Big Sky. 4
Wright then successfully sued the settling party DeBeer for in-
demnification based on a provision in their plumbing contract. 5
The, court found that the language of the indemnification clause
was broad enough to allow Wright to recover despite his negligence,
whether active or passive. 6 The clause constituted "some other le-
gal transaction between the parties" in addition to the obligations
arising from their relationship. Because the claim was not in tort,
there was no need for the court to consider active/passive or pri-
mary/secondary negligence in shifting the burden to one party.
Rather, the court viewed this as purely contractual indemnity in
which tort standards for indemnification did not apply.
The court also made it clear that defendant DeBeer had no
right of contribution against defendant Big Sky. Because the judg-
ment in the original suit was against Wright and Big Sky and did
not involve DeBeer, the court noted that DeBeer had no standing
to raise the contribution issue. In addition, because the original
suit did not involve comparative negligence, under the Consoli-
dated holding a right of contribution could not arise.
94. Id. at __, 604 P.2d at 325.
95. "(1) To indemnify and save harmless the contractor [Wright] from and against any
and all suits, claims, actions, losses, costs, penalties, and damages, of whatsoever kind or
nature, . . . arising out of, in connection with, or incident to the subcontractor's [DeBeer]
performance of this subcontract." - Mont. -, 604 P.2d at 325.
96. But cf. Rogers v. Western Airline, - Mont. __, 602 P.2d 171, 173-74 (1979). In that
case, plaintiff sued the airline for injuries at the Great Falls airport and the airline at-
tempted to join the city for indemnification. By contract, the airline guaranteed to hold the
city harmless unless the city was itself negligent. Interpreting this guarantee, the court
found no implied right of indemnity running from the city to the airline and approved sum-
mary judgment in favor of the city. The court noted that if the airline were found to be
negligent it could have no claim for indemnity against another tortfeasor. What the airline
failed to show, and what appears to distinguish Crosby v. Billings Deaconess Hosp., 149
Mont. 314, 320, 426 P.2d 217, 220 (1967), is "that the airline's liability to the plaintiff arose
only because of the relationship between the first party indemnitee [airline] and the second
party indemnitor . . . and not due to any negligence on the part of the first party claiming
indemnity." Id. at __, 602 P.2d at 174.
97. See Cordier v. Stetson-Ross, Inc., - Mont. -, 604 P.2d 86, 91 (1979).
98. See Ferguson v. Town Pump, Inc., - Mont. -, 580 P.2d 915, 920 (1978).
99. Wright, - Mont. __, 604 P2d at 326.
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